NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 28 | Number 2

Article 10

2-1-1950

Corporations -- Process -- Service on NonResident Directors of Domestic Corporation
A. A. Zollicoffer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
A. A. Zollicoffer, Corporations -- Process -- Service on Non-Resident Directors of Domestic Corporation, 28 N.C. L. Rev. 201 (1950).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol28/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

1950]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

How to maintain public order without impairing our freedoms of
expression is one of the major dilemmas of our time. The public turns
to the law and to the lawyer for its solution. The lawyer can help with
the answer only when he is aware that every restriction placed upon
the free exchange of ideas of public interest, however justified, is a
restriction upon a basic right of a citizen in a free society and, further,
realizes that those elements which would overthrow our democratic
society employ disorder and mob violence as primary weapons. 2 0
WILLIAM

V. BuiRow.

Corporations-Process-Service on Non-Resident
Directors of Domestic Corporation
The corporation is a necessary party to a stockholders' derivative
suit against the directors for mismanagement.1 This suit has been held
to be an action in personam, 2 service not being allowed by publication
on the non-resident directors. 3 Thus a long recognized problem arises :4
How can service of process be had on non-resident directors in the jurisdiction where the corporation is resident? " * * * those (directors) who
have looted and misappropriated corporate assets will be enabled to
escape liability by reason of the fact that the corporation is not doing
of their inhabitants from the aggressions of organized bands operating in large

numbers. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). . . . Neither a private
party nor a public authority can invoke otherwise valid state laws against trespass
to exclude from their property groups bent on disseminating propaganda. Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Picketing is largely immunized from control on the ground that it is free speech, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and police may not regulate sound trucks
and loud-speakers, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)." See Terminiello v.
Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 907 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
20 Mr. Norman Thomas, writing out of his rich experience, said very recently,
"The heretic has always been the growing point in society. When he is repressed
by force society stagnates . . .clearly our danger is not from the honest dissenter, but from the passions of the mob and those who manipulate it in the struggle for profit and power." Thomas, The Dissenter's Role in- a Totalitarian Age,
N. Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 20, 1949, p. 13.
113 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (PEam. ED.) §5997.
23 FLETCHER CYc. CoRp. (PER1.
ED.) §1283.

'Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 Atl. 621 (1901), Southern Mills Inc. v. Armstrong, 223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943), cf. McNaughton v. Broach, 236
App Div. 448, 260 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1932). Seinble Bauer v. Parker, 82 App.
Div. 289, 81 N.Y. Supp. 995 (1903). But cf. Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359,
114 N. E. 841 (1916). Note, 148 A. L. R. 1251.
'Greer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); see Freeman v.
Bean, 243 App. Div. 503, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310, 311 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
Report of Law Revision Commission for 1941, N. Y. La. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (I).
27 CORN. L.Q. 74 (1941) ; 22 VA. L. Rav. 153 (1935) ; 33 VA. L. REV. 187 (1947) ;
44 Y. L. J. 1041 (1934). Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir.
1947) discusses this problem in federal jurisdiction.
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business within the jurisdiction where the wrongdoers reside and where
they alone can be served." 5

In 1947 the Legislature of South Carolina passed a statute in an
attempt to remedy this unwarranted situation as to South Carolina
corporations.0 The statute provides in essence that by becoming or
remaining a director in a domestic corporation, a non-resident thereby

appoints the Secretary of State of South Carolina his lawful attorney
in fact for service of process in the courts of South Carolina for any
action thereafter 7 arising relating to actions of the corporation which
arose While he held office. In a recent case arising under this statute
the Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to give the statute retroactive effect, saying: "Not only does the act evince an intent that it
should operate prospectively but such is the reasonable inference from
the fiction of implied consent upon which it is based." s Thus the constitutionality of the statute was not directly in issue, but the inference
to be drawn from the opinion is that the court would hold the statute
constitutional, a proper case arising.
This South Carolina statute appears to have been patterned after
the non-resident motor vehicle laws which have been held constitutional.9 It provides that notice be mailed to the director by the Secretary of State, 10 that such continuance shall be granted by the court as
to afford reasonable opportunity to defend the suit,11 and that any person who is a director may resign within thirty days and not be subject
to this act.' 2 The "motor vehicle laws" have been upheld on the theory
that "In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations
'Goldberg v. Emanuel, 166 Misc. 610, 613, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 943, 946 (Sup. Ct.
1938) rev'd 254 App. Div. 556, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 946 (1st dept. 1938). This problem
would also exist where there are resident directors but they are insolvent.
'Acts and Joint Resolutions South Carolina, 45 STAT. AT LARGE 277 (May 19,
1947).
"Italics added.
'Johnson v. Baldwin, 53 S. E. 2d 785, 787 (S. C. 1949).
'Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
"0Sec. 2: "...; PROVIDED, the Secretary of State shall forthwith forward

one copy of such Summons and Complaint to the non-resident director so served,
by registered mail directed to such non-resident director at the last address filed
with the Secretary of State as hereinafter provided." This is a requirement under
the decision of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
" Sec. 5: PENDING ACTIONS.-"That the Court in which any action provided for herein is pending shall orde such continuance as may be necessary to
afford such non-resident director so served as provided herein reasonable opportunity to defend the action."
"Sec. 6: NONRESIDENT DIRECTOR RESIGNING SUCH OFFICE.
"That any person now a non-resident director of any such domestic corporation
who shall within thirty (30) days from the date of approval of this Act, resign
in good faith as such director and shall file with the Secretary of State a copy of
such signed resignation shall not be subject to the provisions of this Act; and
any person who may hereafter be subject to this Act may terminate its application
as to him except for causes of action already accrued, by bona fide resigning as
such director and filing a signed copy of said resignation with the Secretary of
State;... "'
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reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and
non-residents alike, who use its highways."' 3 Following this idea of "in
the public interest," statutes have been upheld requiring non-residents
"doing business" in a state to appoint agents for service of process.' 4
The reasoning behind these statutes is that although a state may not

exclude an individual from doing business in the state,.5 it may require
that certain conditions be complied with to safeguard its citizens.' o It
is submitted that by participating in the management and direction of
a corporation a director is thereby doing business in the state where the
corporation is present. Is this "doing business" sufficiently related to
the public interest to justify such a statute as South Carolina has passed?
In view of the number of "Blue Sky Laws" and regulations governing
the sale of securities' 7 it would appear that the public is vitally interested
in the protection of the investor. Further the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld an Iowa statute providing for service on an agent
in that state where the non-resident was doing business, his business
being the sale of securities.' 8 It would appear that the South Carolina
statute is a further means of protecting the investor, non-resident as
well as resident, by providing him with a practical means of protecting
his investment against unwarranted acts of corporate directors.
Another approach to this problem would be via the corporation. A
corporation is a creature of the law,19 and it is not entitled to the
"privileges and immunities" clause of the constitutibn.20 The privilege
of forming a corporation is granted by the state,21 therefore the state
necessarily lays down the regulations and requirements to be complied
with in incorporation.2 2 Why could not a state require, as South Carolina has in essence done, that all the directors of a domestic corporation must be amenable to process within the state, non-residents
3 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1926).
"' Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 218 Iowa 529, 255 N. W. 667 (1934) aff'd 294
U.S. 623 (1935), Davidson v. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932),
Doggett v. Peek, 32 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Tex. 1940), aff'd 116 F. 2d 273 (1940),
Wein v. Crockett, Utah , 195 P. 2d 222 (1948). But cf. Flexner v.
Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). 23 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1934); 32 H. L. REv. 87
(1918) ; 20 IowA L. REV. 853 (1934) ; 29 MARQ. L. REv. 31 (1945) ; 32 MIcH. L.
REv." 909
(1933) ; 14 TEX. L. REv. 71 (1935) ; 2 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (1940).
U. S. Coi~sr. ART. IV, §2.
16 "(Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916)) recognizes power of the state
to exclude a nonresident until formal appointment (condition) is made." Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 355, 356 (1926).
1 14 FLErcHER Cyc. CORP. (PamM. ED.) §§6734-6780.

"'fDoherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).

" Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.)

518 .oBlake
(1819). v. MeClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
2 1

BALLANTNE, CORPORATIONS (REV. ED.) §8a; CLARK, CORPORATIONS (21) ED.)
p. 4; STEVENs, CoRPoRATIoNs c. 1, §1; FLETcHER Cyc. CORP. (PERm. ED.) §114.
"' 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (PERM. ED.) §114.
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through service on the Secretary of State? This would not appear to
be a discrimination in violation of the constitution, but rather a provi8
sion to put nonresidents on an equal footing with residents2 amenable
to process within the state, the only difference being in the type of
service. The Supreme Court of the United States has said, "Literal
and precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable, it is not
24
required."1
A closely related problem arose in North Carolina in connection with
the "double liability" feature of bank stock.25 A resident of New York
held stock in a North Carolina bank. The bank failed and an assessment
was made against the stock of the non-resident and docketed in the local
county where the bank was located, in accordance with the North Carolina statute. On failure of the stockholder to pay this assessment, the
commissioner brought suit on said assessment in New York,2 0 and recovery was allowed on the theory that the non-resident stockholder assented to this type of liability by becoming a member of the corporation.2 7 Thus, if a stockholder by becoming a member of a corporation
consents to the liability involved, why could this not hold true for a
non-resident director in a South Carolina corporation under the statute
herein discussed?
From the foregoing discussion it is submitted that this South Carolina statute should be upheld as constitutional and very desirable.
Though it is conceded that this type of statute may tend to discourage
incorporation in South Carolina, 29 this seemingly disadvantageous aspect is well overcome by the advantage secured to the investing public
in being able to better protect its interest.

A. A. ZOLLICOrFER.
Doherty & Co. v.Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935), Kane v.N. J., 242 U.S. 160

(1916).

" Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) quoting from Canadian Northern Ry.
Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 561-562 (1919).
It is interesting to note further that the Supreme Court has upheld a statute
requiring non-residents to post bond for cost, even though such is not required of
a resident. Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). N. C. GEr. STAT. §28-35
(1943) requires a foreign executor to post bond whereas a local executor does not
have to.
" N. C. Pub. Laws (1927) c.113, §13. This statute was held constitutional
in Corp. Com.of the State of North Carolina v. Murphey, 197 N. C. 42, 147 S.E.
667 (1929) aff'd 280 U.S. 534 (1939).
' Said assessment "shall be recorded and indexed as judgments, and shall have
the force and effect of a judgment of the Superior Court of this state **** if not
paid execution may ***-*** issue against the stockholder delinquent." N. C. Pub.
Laws (1927) c. 113, §13.
"7Hood v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 270 N. Y. 17, 200 N. E. 55 (1936).
It is interesting to note that the court continually repeated that this assessment
was not the same as a judgment, though the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld the statute which said that it was, supra note 26.
" However, it is doubtful whether at the time of incorporation, misfeasance of
the directors is anticipated. A possible solution to avoid the "strike suit" would
be the requirement that a person seeking to take advantage of the procedure under
this statute be required to post a bond to cover the traveling expenses of the nonresident director in defending an unsuccessful suit.

